Abstract
Introduction
The study of populism has mainly focused on developments in Western Europe and Latin America.
Those that have been interested in Eastern Europe focus strongly on Central and Eastern European countries and/or on Russia. There has been very little academic engagement with populist movements in the post-Yugoslav states. 1 However, there has been a rise of populist parties in the area, including populist left-wing parties, radical right wing parties and clientelistic parties that use populist rhetoric. It it will be shown how populism has been used by the country's elite to ensure their grip on power, while at the same discrediting "Others" as enemies of the state. In doing so, this article will not only shed light on the mechanisms that the DPS uses to stay in power, but it will also contribute to a discussion of a new form of populism -a state-sponsored populist discourse that justifies one-party rule.
This contribution will progress in the following steps: First, we will provide an overview of the current discussion on populism and its multiple dimensions in contemporary politics. In the second step, we offer a backdrop for the analysis of populism by discussing the development of Montenegrin politics since 1997, when the ruling party of the country split. The third section will outline the mechanisms the DPS has developed in order to ensure its dominance in Montenegro, before the final section which will assess the role of populism in Montenegrin politics. We will reflect on the development of a new form of populism in the Conclusion -a populist discourse, supported by the ruling Montenegrin elite to protect and enhance a clientelistic network of influence in the country's political, economic and societal sphere.
Populism-One Term, many Meanings
Populism as a term is traditionally hard to define. One of the first engagements with the term in the academic literature can be found in the works of Ernesto Laclau, who argued that populism is an articulation of popular themes in opposition to the power bloc. He specifically focused on what he called 'progressive left-wing' populism, which would mobilise the oppressed people (i.e. the working class) 8 While Laclau and Canovan have substantially contributed to our understanding of populism as a political ideology, according to Nicos Mouzelis, what they have failed to do is looking at populism also as a social reality.
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Following this line of reasoning, populism needs to be studied as a strategy that actors (most notably political parties) utilise, in order to mobilise 'the people' against the existing elites. In this respect, distinctions are drawn between populist movements in different parts of the world, particularly in Western Europe and Latin America. 10 . According to Cas Mudde, populism focuses on a discourse in which society is divided into 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite.' 11 The ultimate aim, according to
Mudde is 'that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people.' 12 Rensmann argues that populism is anti-pluralistic, anti-liberal, and anti-constitutional as a result of the strong focus on the collective sovereignty in comparison (and opposition) to individual rights. 13 The six key features of populism that will be considered in this article go back to the work of Paul Taggart. 14 He argued that populism is always characterised by hostility towards the internal and external establishment. These can be political elites, certain political structures, political practices etc.
Important here is to highlight that the critique of internal and external structures can be strongly interlinked. As will be discussed in more detail below, one of the reasons for the split of the DPS in 1997, and the consequent dissociation of links with the Milošević regime in Serbia, lies in the fact that Milošević and his allies were seen as the establishment, responsible for Yugoslavia's international isolation and bad reputation after the wars in the early 1990s.
Taggart furthermore highlights the importance of a connection between 'the people' and a heartland, an idealised place for the people. 15 This is particularly important in the case of Montenegro, as ethnic engineering and the creation and strengthening of Montenegrin identity have been the nexus of the DPS' campaign, first for Montenegro's dissociation with Serbia and independence, and more recently to strengthen its grip on power and portray Montenegro as a new frontrunner in terms of political and economic reforms (and EU integration) in the post-Yugoslav space.
Third, Taggart highlights the importance of vagueness of populism and its lack of core values.
In the case of Montenegro, the DPS is a party without a sharp ideological profile. Rather, it resembles a clientelistic network with many different interest groups represented within it. This is important because the DPS itself is not a populist party per se, but uses populist methods to keep control of this clientelistic network of competing interests.
Furthermore, Taggart points out that all populisms are characterised by an appeal to a sense of crisis. This can be an economic crisis, as has traditionally been the case in Latin America, or it can be an identity crisis, as is the case with many right-wing populist movements in Western Europe. The sense of crisis results in people feeling lost and losing faith in the political establishment to deal with the crisis and quickly improve the situation. In the case of Montenegro, the political crisis that resulted from the Yugoslav Wars in the early 1990s, the Kosovo War a few years later, and the feeling that Serbia dominated and held the joint Yugoslav state (and later the state union) back, all resulted in a crisis which the DPS exploited to push its independence agenda.
In addition, Taggart discusses the importance of political leadership in populism. While a political leader does not create a populist movement per se, but needs the socio-economic conditions in which people would support populist discourses, leadership is nevertheless very important in populist movements. In Montenegro this is visible through the dominance of Milo Đukanović, who has been President of the country, Prime Minister multiple times, and has been in charge of the DPS for many years. He has been the main driver of political change, and has been able to establish a network in which his family members own a substantial property and control major parts of the private sector in Montenegro, while he keeps tight control over the public sector. 16 Finally, building on the previous two points, Taggart highlights that populism has a chameleonic nature; it can adapt to different and changing situations. This can also be observed in Montenegro, where there have often been very conflictual relations between the government and the opposition. However, in light of demands from the EU, Đukanović was able to come to an agreement with leading opposition leaders to implement important reforms, which would allow the country to progress in its integration into the EU. This needed to be done, as it was not only demanded by the majority of people, but also because many of the networks that are part of the DPS profit from intensified EU integration.
These six factors will be used to explain the use of populist rhetoric and methods by the DPS and Đukanović in order to protect, enhance and maintain their clientilistic system within Montenegro.
The following section will provide a brief overview of the political development in Montenegro since the mid-1990s, before returning to these six elements of populism and applying them in more detail to
Montenegro. The bifurcation of the DPS in the first half of 1997 ended the political monolith in Montenegro. Serbia was supported by 44.5% of the voters. 26 Obviously, the referendum victory allowed the DPS to capitalise on the results of the independence vote and to rediscover itself as the pioneer of Montenegrin sovereignty, national identity, and an advocate of EU integration. The defeat of the unionist position in the independence referendum fragmented the Montenegrin opposition, thus effectively further strengthening DPS rule after 2006. EU integration has taken place, both, because of the DPS's rule and its strong support for further progress towards EU membership, and despite of the DPS's grip on power, which in many aspects has undermined the democratic consolidation of the country. In other words, the DPS has established a number of mechanisms to ensure its hold on power, and these will be discussed in the next section.
Political Developments in Montenegro 1996-2015: A Snapshot

Understanding the DPS's Rule in Montenegro
Being in power since the early 1990s (and even before that, if it is taken into account that the DPS is the successor of the League of Communists of Montenegro) has enabled the DPS to develop a number of mechanisms to ensure its continued dominance in Montenegrin politics.
First, as the party in charge during the turbulent 1990s, the DPS was effectively in control of Montenegro's economy as well as the black market, which played a key role when sanctions were put on the FRY as a result of its involvement in the wars in Croatia and Bosnia and its later actions in Kosovo. Đukanović himself was indicted for involvement in cigarette smuggling in Italy, but the charges were later dropped. Fifth, it has been argued that the DPS's ability to adapt and change its discourse has contributed to its grip on power. 40 This applies to the party's ability to respond to changing demands of the population. It first captured public support by supporting Serbia during the process of Yugoslav dissolution, before the party changed its discourse to disassociate itself from Milošević and his allies.
It then adopted the discourse of Montenegrin sovereignty and led the campaign for Montenegro's independence. 41 Since Montenegro's independence in 2006, the party has become the champion of the country's membership in the EU and has successfully positioned itself as the main driving force for further progress towards eventual EU accession.
Populism is not the sixth mechanism that the DPS uses to stay in power. Instead, it is a tool used by the government to emphasize the five other mechanisms it utilises to ensure its continued dominance in Montenegrin politics. In other words, the DPS is not a populist party, it exploits a populist discourse in order to highlight the different mechanisms it has developed over time to ensure its sustained dominance in the country. The link between these different mechanisms and the use of populist rhetoric, using Taggart's framework as discussed above, will be the content of the next section.
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Elements of Populism in Montenegrin Politics
As highlighted in the Introduction, the DPS is not a populist party per se. However, the analysis shows that many elements of populism were present in establishing and maintaining the two-and-a-half decade long rule of Đukanović's DPS. 43 The 'Othering' of political opponents both internal and external, the emphasis on the heartland, the lack of the party's ideological profile, reproduction of crisis, charismatic leadership and chameleonic nature are all characteristic of the DPS's politics since the Yugoslav breakup.
'Othering'
Even though the major internal antagonisation of political opponents by the DPS characterised this party's politics since 1997, it is important to highlight that hostility towards the internal and external establishment was also significant in the first half of the 1990s. attempted to revive the myth of heroism. 46 The 'enthusiastic participation of Montenegrin soldiers', in the attacks on Croatia resonated back to the domestic political scene and created the perception of threat by the external environment. 47 Equally, such perceptions hardened the position of the local minority population, which were marginalised in the political life. In the post-independence period, the DPS has recreated the connection between the people and Montenegro as the 'heartland' not only through nationalising policies, including language, state symbols, etc., but also by highlighting the country's progress in EU accession. 53 Headlines emphasising that 'Montenegro is the regional leader in EU integration' have been another element of populist rhetoric that underpins the long standing rule of the DPS. 
Crisis
In circumstances of political and economic instability, citizens' security becomes a salient issue at the societal level. 58 People tend to affiliate themselves to ideas that provide them with a greater guarantee of well-being and their loyalties as a result become changeable. In the case of Montenegro, the first signs of dismantled security appeared in the late 1980s, with the failure of the project of Yugoslav socioeconomic reconstruction. The socialist economy that guaranteed people a sense of stability suffered from rapid decay. This process intensified with the collapse of the common state at the beginning of the 1990s. 59 The wars in the neighbouring republics and the hyperinflation in 1993 evoked a societal crisis and increased the people's dependency on the decisions taken by the political leadership.
In addition, the DPS split occurred in 1997, when the political and economic situation was still unstable, thus allowing Đukanović's wing of the party to effectively capitalise on the support from Western countries. That is, in a crisis-struck environment, the DPS presented itself as reformist, cementing its dominance in Montenegro's politics. The environment of crisis was further emphasised by the status question until 2006 and the perpetuation of instability opened up the possibilities for the reconstruction of political and national identities. In fact, the statehood and identity divide in Montenegro consumed public life to the extent that it deprived any other political issue of its substance.
According to Milan Popović, populism, which was induced in Montenegro by the divide into proindependence and unionist camps, reflected the 'abnormality of total polarisation to such extent that any dissonance was unnoticed'. 60 Even in the post-independence period, the DPS operates in an environment of crisis, which it effectively uses to present itself as a 'problem-solver'. This is evident in the party's Program, which emphasises that
[w]e live in turbulent times, the era of globalisation. It brings unknown things and new opportunities. The global economic crisis has left harsh consequences, and nothing is as it used to be before the crisis. The global financial markers and new information technologies diminish national sovereignty. Environmental devastation, climate change, and natural catastrophes trouble the world, both the developed and the developing countries. Crime and terrorism are becoming a global occurrence.
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After having described the difficult global environment, accentuating a number of crises and threats, the same Program stipulates that the DPS has the role and the purpose of 'ensuring the good for all the citizens of Montenegro; creating job opportunities for everyone; that everyone creates better living conditions for themselves; security; health and social welfare'. 62 The use of 'crisis' as a proxy for political ambitions clearly indicates the presence of this element of populism in the DPS discourse.
Leadership
In Montenegro, the politics of personality have always played an important role in gaining popular support. This is mostly due to the dense social links and the remembrance of the historical need of a 
Conclusion
The DPS, and with it the wider politics of Montenegro remain a unique phenomenon in the postYugoslav space. The party has remained in power since the early 1990s, and has survived internal splits, Montenegro's independence and more recent obstacles in the process of EU integration. In fact, as we have demonstrated, these processes were not only driven by the DPS, but the party has also been able to address new challenges and remain at the centre of Montenegrin politics.
By doing so, the DPS has used an array of mechanisms. Taking control over the state and major segments of the economy has enabled the DPS to portray itself as "the state party" of Montenegro, which is in charge of political progress and economic development. Populist discourses have underlined the DPS's grip on power. From the instrumentalisation of a charismatic leader to the open defamation of opposition to the party's rule, elements of the DPS power-nexus clearly symbolise populist rhetoric and populist mechanisms. However, the DPS is not a populist party as such.
Unlike populist parties in Western Europe, the DPS has been in government and in charge of
Montenegrin politics for more than 25 years. Hence, their populist discourse has used processes of 'Othering' and references to the 'Heartland' not to distinguish itself from the ruling elite (which is the DPS), but to identify internal and external opposition to the DPS's self-portrayed role as the protector and saviour of the Montenegrin nation. Populism theory struggles to explain this form of populism, which is not only promoted by a party in government (as has been the case in Latin America), but has also been persistent and successful for nearly three decades. Populism, in other words, is utilised by the DPS to underline its dominance and leadership in Montenegrin politics. The kind of populism used by the DPS can hardly be positioned on the left-right spectrum, which is usually used to categorise populism. Instead, it contains elements of a strong right-wing discourse on the Montenegrin nation, its independence and the threats it faces in a globalised world. In this respect, the DPS uses a discourse that is very familiar to similar debates in far-right wing parties in Western Europe. 70 Processes of 'Othering' and references to the 'Heartland' help to undermine this form of right-wing, nationalist populism. At the same time, the analysis above has demonstrated that the DPS refers to social welfare, the protection of the people from economic changes, and is critical towards the economic effects of globalisation. The state, and the DPS as a state party, is essential in the protection of the people from economic liberalisation and economic crisis, a discourse utilised by many populist movements and parties in Latin America. This form of populism is closer to left-wing ideals, or economic populism, as
